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INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE WILDFIRE 
LEGISLATION 
Each year, thousands of acres of state and federal lands burn 
because of negligence by railroads, utility companies, logging 
companies, and others. Early in the 2016 fire season there were at 
least forty large-scale fire incidents burning across the western United 
States.1 In addition to threatening the public and putting firefighters’ 
lives at risk, such fires cost millions of dollars to suppress; they 
destroy merchantable timber and fiber worth many millions more; 
they destroy valuable wildlife habitat; they diminish other vital 
environmental services provided by forests and adjacent lands, 
including scenic vistas, hiking, wildlife observation, absorption of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide, and control of erosion; they impose 
enormous restoration costs on government; and they degrade natural 
resources for decades. When fire conditions are severe, state and 
federal lands can suffer astronomical fire losses in a single season, 
and those seasons are beginning to last year-round.2 
Western populations have grown exponentially in recent years, and 
with this growth has come the expansion of the wildland-urban 
interface.3 Urban sprawl, enticing recreational areas, and scenic views 
have encouraged many to build homes and communities in areas that 
were once undeveloped lands—undeveloped lands that burned 
regularly. Those choosing to live in these areas may not appreciate the 
ecological value of a forest fire, nor do insurance companies enjoy 
paying out large sums of money to policy holders when those fires 
destroy entire communities. The insurance industry has responded to 
the growing threat of wildfire by offering fire-proofing education and 
inspection programs; however, the industry has also increased rates in 
 
1 Active Fire Mapping Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://fsapps.nwcg.gov/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018) (at the time of the researching for this Article this cite was used to 
determine the number of fires burning at that time. This citation provides that information 
as historical fire data). 
2 Eric Holthaus, Get Used to the Flames: California’s “Fire Season” is Basically Year-
Round Now, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future 
_tense/2014/04/california_s_fire_season_is_basically_year_round_now.html. 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE OPERATIONS: EFFECTS ON 
THE FOREST SERVICE’S NON-FIRE WORK 3 (2015), https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default 
/files/2015-Fire-Budget-Report.pdf. 
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high-risk areas, and has even dropped policies, which has garnered 
criticism from policy holders and the government alike.4 
Ultimately, fire management falls to the government. The federal 
agency charged with managing fires and the lands affected by them is 
the United States Forest Service (USFS or “Forest Service”). Robert 
Keiter sums up the problem faced by the government with the 
increased wildland-urban interface: “[d]iscounting the fact that they 
have chosen to live in a fire prone environment, these new residents 
demand and expect government protection from fire dangers lurking 
on adjacent public lands, frequently asserting private property rights 
to support their demands.”5 Despite the public’s expectations, the 
Forest Service is having an increasingly difficult time meeting those 
demands and needs. 
The Forest Service notes in a 2015 report that “[f]unding for non-
fire programs has not kept pace with the increased cost of fighting 
fire.”6 In 2014, the firefighting budget grew by $115 million, which 
decreased funding to management and non-fire programs by the 
same.7 This cut required the agency to “forego opportunities to 
complete vital restoration work and meet public expectations for 
services.”8 Such non-fire services include “those that improve the 
health and resilience of our forested landscapes and mitigate the 
potential for wildland fire in future years.”9 The 2015 report further 
noted that recreation facilities will need to be closed due to the 
inability to maintain premises, especially water services and septic 
systems.10 It goes on to state, “[a]s a lack of funds forces the Forest 
Service to delay needed maintenance and improvements on many 
roads and bridges, access will become more restricted, environmental 
impacts will increase rapidly, and vulnerability to catastrophic failure 
from natural disasters will greatly increase.”11 This Article will go on 
to suggest that, if such programs are funded properly, they could be 
invaluable during a statutorily imposed restoration process, as they 
 
4 Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of 
Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 356–57 (2006). 
5 Id. at 374. 




10 Id. at 9–10. 
11 Id. at 10. 
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would aide in identifying baseline conditions, expediting early 
restoration processes. 
Congress has recognized the budgeting crisis that faces the Forest 
Service and has attempted on numerous occasions to find a solution.12 
The most recent efforts came in May 2016 when Senators Lisa 
Murkowsi (R. Alaska), Maria Cantwell (D. Wash.), Ron Wyden (D. 
Ore.), and Mike Crapo (R. Idaho) of the Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee released a bipartisan discussion draft titled 
Wildfire Budgeting, Response, and Forest Management Act 
(WBRFMA).13 Recognizing the economic toll wildfires have taken on 
the nation in the last few years, the bill aims to find a solution to 
budgeting problems with in the fire management agencies in order to 
work toward a twenty-first century management strategy.14 
The way fire management is currently structured will not be 
sustainable in the future. The current budget for the Forest Service 
and other similarly charged agencies does not provide enough for 
both preventative management and actual fire response.15 The 
government is able to recoup some of its costs through lawsuits 
against negligent actors, but the sporadic and unpredictable recoveries 
cannot be counted on as the only solutions. Rather, a comprehensive 
command and control statute that allows for damage recovery would 
give certainty to litigation and aid current proposed legislation to 
alleviate budgetary issues. Though the 2016 WBRFMA discussion 
draft is a step in the right direction toward adopting a better 
management and budgeting strategy, it would be bolstered by further 
legislation treating wildfires as what they very often are: 
environmental disasters. 
 
12 See, e.g., Rob Chaney, Long-term Budget Fix for Fighting Wildfires Dies in 
Congress, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Dec. 09, 2016, http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and    
-regional/montana/long-term-budget-fix-for-fighting-wildfires-dies-in-congress/article_2a 
b6abd0-8e40-5b91-ba6d-adfe70049b61.html. 
13 Senators Work to Improve Forest Management and Wildfire Budgeting, U.S. SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NAT. RESOURCES (May 25, 2016), https://www.energy 
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/5/senators-work-to-improve-forest-management-and    
-wildfire-budgeting. 
14 Id. 
15 DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 3, at 2 (In a recent report, the Forest Service (the 
primary agency tasked with fighting wildfire) noted that “[i]n 1995, fire made up 16 
percent of the Forest Service’s annual appropriated budget—this year [2015], for the first 
time, more than 50 percent of the Forest Service’s annual budget will be dedicated to 
wildfire.”). 
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The United States has faced several large-scale environmental 
disasters that have prompted legislative reform since the 1970s, the 
most notable being the Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill of 1989.16 When 
traditional maritime and tort law were insufficient to restore the 
ecosystem and recoup the costs of the spill, Congress adopted the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).17 Having a reliable statutory framework 
has made dealing with subsequent oil spills a more efficient, 
comprehensive, and final process. There is no reason why a similar 
statutory structure to those applied in the context of an oil spill could 
not be applied to wildfires. Aside from articulating a strong public 
policy, such a statute would provide a uniform rule allowing the 
government to recoup its cost for natural resource damages resulting 
from wildfires that might begin to offset the budget crisis federal 
agencies are currently facing. 
One notable attribute of OPA and similar large-scale 
environmental disaster statutes, such as the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA),18 is the damage assessment procedure, or Natural 
Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA), which often utilizes a 
methodology known as habitat equivalency analysis (HEA) to 
estimate natural resource damages.19 Many federal environmental 
statutes utilize the NRDA process, in order to assess environmental 
damage and develop restoration plans following an environmental 
disaster.20 
During a NRDA, natural resource trustees at state and federal 
levels are charged with determining whether or not a natural resource 
has been injured, the extent of that injury based on baseline conditions 
of the resource prior to the damage, and calculating the appropriate 
compensation.21 In order to calculate the actual damage dollar 
amount, trustees, using guidance from regulations, often will rely on 
 
16 See ROVER V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 103–14 (Richard 
A. Epstein et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992). 
17 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–20 (West 2018) (effective Oct. 15, 2010); see generally Allan 
Kanner, Natural Resource Restoration, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 355 (2015); OIL POLLUTION 
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION ACT OF 1989, S. REP. NO. 101-94 (1989). 
18 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601–9675 (West 2018). 
19 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.10.30, .50–.56 (Jan. 1, 
2011) (providing relevant OPA regulations); CERCLA §§ 9607, 9611. 
20 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.10.30, .50–.56. 
21 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(b)–(g) (West 2018). 
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HEA, a method by which to determine damage costs that focuses 
primarily on habitat-to-habitat restoration rather than attempting to 
pin a market value price tag on a given resource.22 It contemplates the 
whole ecosystem rather than compartmentalizing specific aspects. 
The main goal of these NRDAs is always first and foremost 
restoration of the natural resource.23 
In large-scale environmental disasters, it is often most effective if 
damages are assessed at an ecosystem level to restore natural 
resources to the level necessary to fully compensate the public trust.24 
HEA allows natural resource trustees to do just that and make damage 
determinations not based on monetary values, but on ecosystem 
values. When combined with a twenty-first century forest 
management strategy, a wildfire statute that incorporates the use of 
HEA could bring much needed stability to wildfire law, and perhaps 
begin to prevent these large-scale disasters. 
I 
A HISTORY OF WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT AND DAMAGES 
The government typically seeks four categories of damages in 
wildfire cases: (1) the actual cost of attacking and suppressing a fire; 
(2) the lost commercial value of burned timber; (3) the costs required 
for reforestation of the burned area; and (4) compensation for the 
degradation of natural resources (for example, recreational values, 
loss of habitat, diminution of watershed, loss to future generations) 
while the burned forest recovers from the fire.25 The availability of 
those damages is governed by federal common law, which looks to 
state law as a guide except where it conflicts with federal policy. 
The guiding principle of law is that tort damages should 
compensate “all the damage proximately caused.”26 Courts closely 
examine damages claims in fire cases to ensure that an award only 
compensates for the detriments caused by the fire, and it is California 
law that damages in a fire case must be “reasonable” under the 
 
22 15 C.F.R. § 990.53 (2011). 
23 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(b)–(g). 
24 For a discussion of how the Public Trust pervades many statutes, see Mark Davis & 
Christopher Dalbom, The Trust Abides, 37 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL. No. 4 (Envt’l Law 
Inst. Washington, D.C.), July–Aug. 2015, at 18–19. 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1138–39 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
26 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 2018). 
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circumstances.27 California law raises one question worth addressing 
here: if the government agency recovers primary restoration (of the 
forest habitat) and compensatory damages (loss of use of ecological 
services between the initiation of the injury and completion of the 
restoration), has all ecological and environmental value been 
compensated? From the perspective of the federal trustee,28 the 
answer is generally no. It then follows that there are compensable 
damages remaining. 
Prior to 2000, the federal government would typically settle 
wildfire cases for damages well below ten million dollars.29 In 
California, for example, damages typically ranged between three and 
four million dollars per fire, despite the fact that it was likely much 
more expensive to fight said fire.30 Generally speaking, damages were 
calculated based on the fair market value of the land as it was 
considered a type of property damage; this fails to consider, let alone 
incorporate, the inevitable ecosystem damage—including damage to 
soils, water courses, and animal life. Opponents of actual ecosystem 
valuation in the calculation of damages point incredulously to the 
USFS’ claim that the land in its care has no market value; a defense 
attorney has derisively claimed this renders them “priceless” and is 
the ultimate reason for these unprecedented settlements rather than 
the unavoidable fact that a forest system has far more value than mere 
market value of trees.31 If we were to abide their insistence that the 
only “fair” damage calculation is that based on market value of the 
 
27 See Union Pac. R.R. Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1144 (quoting People v. S. Pac. Co., 139 
Cal. App. 3d 627, 635 (1983)). 
28 See Oil and Hazardous Substance Liability, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(f)(2) (West 2018) 
(effective Dec. 18, 2014); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2) (West 2018) (explaining 
covered removal costs and damages); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(c) (West 2018) (effective 
Jan. 11, 2002) (assigning liability to individuals who are responsible for damaging natural 
resources with hazardous substances). “Trustees” of natural resources are government 
bodies (federal, state, or tribal) that either own or exercise significant control over the use 
of natural resources. 33 U.S.C. § 2706; 42 U.S.C. § 9607. They are the only parties 
authorized to recover natural resource damages under these statutes. 
29 McClatchy Newspapers, U.S. Government to Announce $102M Forest Fire 
Settlement with Railroad, THE GUARDIAN, July 22, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com 
/environment/2008/jul/22/forests.usa (explaining that prior to the Storrie Fire, the largest 
wildfire related settlement was $14 million). 
30 See Steven S. Kimball, Forest Fire Damages in Transition, 56 FED. LAW. 38 (2009). 
31 See Richard S. Linkert, Esq., Are Defendants Getting Burned? Federal Wildfire 
Litigation Policy, MATHENY SEARS LINKERT JAIME, LLP, at 4, http://www.mathenysears 
.com/news/RSL%20Article.pdf. 
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trees, or in the alternative, the cost to replant the trees, it would be 
akin to saying that we should only asses oil spill damages based on 
the market value of the fish lost and the cost to repopulate the 
fisheries. Further still, because USFS land is not given market value, 
damages would be zero. Companies would have free range to 
wantonly burn federal lands. Such an argument is asinine. 
More recently, since the August 17, 2000, Storrie Fire, the 
government has begun to recover costs not only from the commercial 
value of destroyed timber, but also from replanting and from the loss 
of uses of the injured resources, such as recreation, scenery, and 
wildlife habitat.32 The Storrie Fire burned approximately 52,000 acres 
of National Forest System (NFS) land in the Plumas and Lassen 
National Forests.33 The fire was ignited on NFS lands while a Union 
Pacific Railroad Company work crew was repairing a rail.34 After the 
Storrie Fire was extinguished, the United States brought suit against 
Union Pacific Railroad Company.35 The United States contended that 
the Railroad and its work crew breached its duty of care while 
conducting the repair by failing to monitor and suppress the fire 
before leaving the work site.36 The government claimed that it had 
suffered over $121 million in timber damages, between $24 and $33 
million in reforestation costs, and $13 million in loss of use for non-
timber related services which included habitat and environmental 
services.37 
Union Pacific attempted, in vain, to argue that because some of the 
burned lands were considered “off-base”—where no logging is 
permitted for a term of years—that the government could not recover 
damages to timber.38 It further contended that certain Wilderness 
Areas could never be logged or reforested, and as such the 
government could not recover for damages based on pre-fire timber 
valuation or reforestation.39 In an effort to limit damages, Union 
Pacific also argued that it was entitled to an offset for the value of the 
timber the United States was able to salvage, which the court rejected, 
noting that the United States deducted the money it had recovered 
 
32 Kimball, supra note 30, at 38. 
33 United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d, 1136, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
34 Id. at 1139. 
35 Id. at 1138. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1145. 
39 Id. at 1146. 
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from its estimated timber damages.40 Finally, Union Pacific argued 
that HEA damages were duplicative, overlapping, and unauthorized, 
but again, the court found that damages and the methods of 
determining them are broad under California law.41 
The contested habitat equivalency damages included the following: 
1,600 acres of spotted owl habitat; 12,000 acres of carnivore habitat; 
9,000 acres of old growth forest which impacts bald eagles, 
goshawks, and pine martens; impacts to amphibians and fish from silt 
run-off into streams; and scenic and recreational values given the 
area’s location along Highway 70 and the Pacific Crest Trail.42 
Plaintiffs explained that habitat equivalency damages “provide 
compensation for loss of the non-timber forest services that resulted 
from the fire. These services include aesthetic/scenic use, wildlife 
habitat, and recreational use.”43 Ultimately, damages were estimated 
to be $13,236,000.44 Importantly, Judge Damrell highlighted the fact 
that habitat equivalency damages are distinct from mere timber values 
and replanting costs.45 Despite the fact that this method of damage 
determination was not included in the California statute under which 
the plaintiffs brought suit,46 the court found that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to “the amount which will compensate [it] for all the 
detriment proximately caused [by the defendant], whether [the harm] 
could have been anticipated or not.”47 
The court held that the HEA damages were recoverable, despite 
Union Pacific’s arguments to the contrary.48 The court held that under 
California law, specifically section 3333 of the California Civil Code, 
a plaintiff is “entitled to full compensation for all of its damages,”49 
noting that “there is no fixed rule for the measure of tort damages 
under Civil Code section 3333. The measure that most appropriately 




42 Id. at 1151−52. 
43 Id. at 1151. 
44 Id. at 1152. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 2018)). 
48 Id. at 1139. It is important to note that the first time that HEA was recognized in a 
wildfire case was following the 1994 Big Creek Fire. That case settled for $14 million in 
2006. Linkert, supra note 31, at 5. 
49 Union Pac. R.R. Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d, at 1143. 
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adopted.”50 The court went on to state that “the . . . law is clear that 
there is not one particular method for ascertaining . . . damages.”51  
The court highlighted the fact that the plaintiff may argue its many 
identifiable damage categories to the jury.52 The court concluded that 
“diminution in market value is not a reasonable method of 
ascertaining the damages to the unique land at issue,”53 and as such, 
Union Pacific’s argument failed. 
Inadvertently highlighting the purpose of HEA itself, the court 
noted that “[e]ssentially, UP [(Union Pacific)] contends that plaintiff 
has no quantifiable recovery for the destruction of this area-under 
UP’s view, UP effectively had a free pass to burn this land.”54 The 
court emphasized that under the premise set forth by Union Pacific, 
that lacking a monetary value, ecosystems have no compensable value 
whatsoever.55 It also recognized that HEA is designed to address the 
non-anthrocentric values of ecosystems, which have been held time 
and time again as a viable way to calculate accurate natural resource 
damages.56 
Having failed on its summary judgment motions, and facing a jury 
trial with the possibility of a verdict granting damages well over $150 
million, Union Pacific settled with the United States for an 
unprecedented $102 million.57 Unfortunately, a vast majority of the 
settlement money is still sitting in government accounts rather than 
being applied to restoration, a fact that industry defense attorneys are 
quick to point out.58 A comprehensive statute requiring restoration 
plans and prompt implementation would alleviate much of the 
“bureaucratic rumination” such attorneys deride. 
Two years after the Storrie Fire, the Copper Fire broke out in June 
of 2002, eventually consuming over 20,000 acres and damaging both 
private and public property.59 Two cases arose out of the fire—one 
 
50 Id. (quoting Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 105 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 856, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 
51 Id. at 1145. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1147. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 1151–52. 
57 Linkert, supra note 31, at 7. 
58 Id. 
59 United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827, 831 (2012) (noting that the 
fire burned 18,000 acres of National Forest and 2,000 acres of private and county owned  
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seeking damages to compensate for the 18,000 acres of public land 
damaged in the Angeles National Forest, and one for the thirty-four 
acres and building burned on a private ranch.60 
The court in Kelly v. CB & I Constructors, Inc. stated that 
California Civil Code section 3346 applied to wildfires,61 allowing the 
plaintiff to recover for the tree damage from the negligently spread 
fire.62  In contrast, the Third District Court of Appeal held in Gould v. 
Madonna that section 3346 does not apply to negligently caused fires 
as fire damage is governed by the Health and Safety Code.63 
However, the court in Kelly noted multiple places in which Gould was 
wrongly decided, or had since been overruled by subsequent cases.64 
In particular the court noted that fire is considered a trespass, as per 
Elton v. Anheuser-Busch Beverage Group, Inc.65 The court in Gould 
had held otherwise.66 As section 3346 specifically addresses damage 
to trees from trespass, the statute clearly applies.67 The court 
concluded that the two sections are actually easily harmonized—the 
Health and Safety Code section 13007, which allows for recovery for 
damage caused by a negligently ignited fire, and section 3346, which 
allows for doubling of damages for damaged trees by a trespassing 
fire—and allow a plaintiff to recover damages for the negligence as 
well as double the damages to the trees themselves.68 As such, Gould 
 
property); Kelly v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 36 (2009) (noting that 
the fire ultimately consumed 20,000 acres). 
60 Id. 
61 Kelly, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 48. California’s Timber Trespass Statute provides: 
For wrongful injuries to timber, trees or underwood upon the land of another, or 
removal thereof, the measure of damages is three times such sum as would 
compensate for the actual detriment, except that where the trespass was casual or 
involuntary . . . the measure of damages shall be twice the sum as would 
compensate for the actual detriment . . . . 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3346(a) (West 2018). 
62 Kelly, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 48–49. 
63 Gould v. Madonna, 85 Cal. Rptr. 457, 459 (1970). 
64 Kelly, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 45–47. 
65 Id. at 48 (citing Elton v. Aneuser-Busch Beverage Grp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 305–07 
(1996)). 
66 Gould, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 458. 
67 Kelly, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 46–47. 
68 Id. (discussing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13007 (West 2018) and CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3346 (West 2018)). 
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is inapplicable here. Such an expansion is in line with the court’s 
findings in the Storrie Fire case.69 
In the government claims case arising out of the Copper Fire, 
United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
characterized the “intangible environmental damages” as “non-
economic damages.”70 As noted by Richard Linkert, the defense 
attorney in the Moonlight Fire case (discussed below), this 
characterization of damages “appears to open the door for a 
qualitative ‘pain and suffering’ type argument, previously unavailable 
in real or property damage cases.”71 The jury in the lower court 
awarded the United States $28.8 million in these intangible 
environmental damages, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed.72 Linkert 
expressed concern about the approval of the doubled damages in 
Kelly and the “intangible environmental damages” affirmed in CB&I. 
He noted: “[t]he approval of a ‘multiplier’73 without any expert 
environmental economic impact testimony paves the way for an 
award of ‘intangible environmental damages’ that can result in a 
verdict wildly in excess of pre-fire fair market value, again 
unprecedented in real or personal property damage case law.”74 He 
raised further concerns about the alternative price per acre damages 
method, claiming all the while that there is no real expert or scientific 
guidance, which is debatable.75 
In support of his opinion, Linkert highlighted the 2007 Moonlight 
Fire case. The Moonlight Fire burned over 65,000 acres near 
Sacramento, California, before burning into the Antelope Wheeler 
Lightning Complex Fire.76 The fire allegedly started from a bulldozer 
owned and operated by Sierra Pacific Industries striking a rock.77 The 
 
69 See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 
2008). 
70 United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827, 837 (2012). 
71 Linkert, supra note 31, at 9. 
72 CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d at 827. 
73 Id. at 839. 
74 Linkert, supra note 31, at 9. 
75 Id. Mr. Linkert, like many defense attorneys, has fallen victim to the idea that natural 
resource damages are only damages insofar as they have an economic impact on human 
society, failing to recognize that ecosystems support far more than human economic needs. 
Natural resource damage cases are not mere property damage claims; they are cases 
addressing negligently caused harm to the natural resources this country is bound to 
protect not only for the good of its citizens, but for ecosystem and environmental health on 
the whole. 
76 Id. at 4. 
77 Id. 
KANNER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2018  10:30 AM 
2018] Like a Phoenix Rising from the Ashes: 59 
Melding Wildfire Law into a Comprehensive Statute 
case settled for an unprecedented $122.5 million, a large part of 
which was based on a HEA.78 The United States’ HEA expert, Robert 
Unsworth, posited that intangible environmental damages calculated 
with the HEA model were $43 million, a significantly smaller amount 
than the United States claimed in its original complaint.79 Linkert also 
noted that the “defense HEA experts, using Mr. Unsworth’s own 
methodology and applying an offset for future fire suppression costs 
that he utilized in all prior cases, came up with a net HEA award in 
the $2 to $3 million range.”80 Though different than Mr. Unsworth’s 
calculations, it should be noted that in nearly all environmental 
damage cases, the experts inevitably disagree on the extent and 
amount of damages to be awarded.81 
Mr. Linkert’s observations and concerns highlight the most 
important argument for a wildfire statute akin to other environmental 
damage statutes. If it were to be drafted in the same vein as OPA and 
CERCLA, such a statute would provide certainty and finality for 
defendants. Regulatory guidance would help to ensure the damage 
calculations are not wildly out of proportion to actual damages, and 
do not fluctuate wildly between even the plaintiff’s own experts. 
II 
RECENT ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS WILDFIRE-RELATED CONCERNS 
A. Wildfire Budgeting, Response, and Forest Management Act 
Fire is a particularly difficult element to manage and control. 
Congress and the Forest Service have historically struggled to find 
balance between suppression and management.82 Prior to large fires 
 
78 See Dani Meyer, Calif. AG Blasts Misconduct Claims in Wildfire Appeal, LAW360, 
http://www.law360.com/articles/754286/calif-ag-blasts-misconduct-claims-in-wildfire       
-appeal; see also Denny Walsh & Sam Stanton, Judge Rejects Sierra Pacific Attempt to 
Throw out Moonlight Fire Settlement, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 17, 2015, 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article18804324.html. The Moonlight Fire 
Settlement has a unique payment schedule that consists of a payment of $55 million and 
deeding over 22,500 acres of Sierra Pacific’s property. Moonlight Fire Litigation, 
DOWNEY BRAND, LLP, https://www.downeybrand.com/Our-Work/Moonlight-Fire-Liti 
gation? (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). Save for the extraneous claims, such a structure may 
be useful in future fire settlements. 
79 Linkert, supra note 31, at 9. 
80 Id. 
81 See Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural 
Resource Damage Actions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 417 (2005). 
82 Keiter, supra note 4, at 309–10. 
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that occurred in the 1970s, United States wildfire policy was complete 
fire suppression.83 In fact, between 1946 and 1978, wildfires burned 
less than one million acres annually.84 Prior to 1946, more than two 
million acres would burn annually.85 Suppression policy, compounded 
by climate change and increasingly ill-managed forested lands, have 
resulted in wildfires that have burned nearly ten million acres 
annually in recent years.86 Science has shown that the suppression 
approach only makes fire more frequent and intense.87 As Keiter 
notes, “a scientific consensus began to emerge by mid-century that 
fire played an important and irreplaceable role in shaping the 
landscape and in reducing wildfire intensity.”88 
In an effort to incorporate this consensus into fire management, 
new practices were adopted, but not without their own set of 
problems.89 Managers use prescribed burns, but the now neighboring 
public has (well-founded) concerns about air quality and health 
hazards from the blowing smoke, as well as fear that the fire will 
become uncontrollable.90 Using hazard-mitigating cutting has faced 
backlash from environmentalists who raise Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) concerns for species like the spotted owl.91 
Underlying all of these issues is the fact that fires today are more 
frequent, more intense, and more expensive. Since the prolonged fire 
season in 1970, and especially after the catastrophic Yellowstone fire 
in 1988,92 the forest managers and Congress have struggled with the 
best fire management strategies. Congress has attempted multiple 
times to fix both the budgeting and best practices issues in forest 
management and wildfire suppression.93 The most recent of these 
 
83 Id. at 306. 
84 Id. at 307. 
85 Id. 
86 Climate Change Indicators: Wildfires, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-wildfires (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2017). 
87 Keiter, supra note 4, at 315. 
88 Id. at 307. 
89 Id. at 308–09. 
90 Leah Burrows, ‘Smoke Waves’ Will Affect Millions in Coming Decades, HARVARD 
GAZETTE (Aug. 17, 2016), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/08/smoke-waves   
-will-affect-millions-in-coming-decades/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm 
_campaign=hu-twitter-general. 
91 Lawson Fite, Using Post-Fire Timber Salvage to Restore Spotted Owl Habitat, 31 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. 23, 26 (2016). 
92 Keiter, supra note 4, at 309. 
93 Id. at 312–13. 
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attempts is the proposed Wildfire Budgeting, Response and Forest 
Management Act (WBRFMA), which was heard by the Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee on June 23, 2016.94 
Over the years, Congress has passed a few statutes and initiatives 
to restructure forest management, fire prevention, and fire-fighting.95 
In 2003, the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA) attempted to 
streamline the process for approval of management plans by reducing 
other statutory requirements under statutes such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).96 Generally speaking, the 
agencies believed that there was too much law governing their 
actions, preventing them from following through with meaningful 
management, preventative measures, and fire response in a timely 
fashion, despite the fact that there was, and still remains, very little 
fire-specific law in place.97 However, following these initiatives, 
“agencies still have precious little statutory guidance on wildfire 
policy, and even less accountability for their fire management 
decisions.”98 
In an effort to fix the funding gaps between fire-fighting and fire 
prevention, Senators Lisa Murkowski (R. Alaska), Maria Cantwell 
(D. Wash.), Ron Wyden (D. Ore.), and Mike Crapo (R. Idaho) 
proposed the WBRFMA.99 The proposed Act’s main objective is to 
end the practice of fire borrowing, which is simply the practice of 
using forest management funds to fight fires.100 Senator Crapo noted 
that “[s]elf-destructive fire borrowing has impacted all aspects of the 
Forest Service’s budget, resulting in less management of our forests, 
 
94 Wildfire Budget, Response and Forest Management, Hearing on Wildfire Budgeting, 
Response and Forest Management Act of 2016 Before the S. Energy and Nat. Res. Comm. 
114th Cong. (2016); Hearings and Testimony of the 114th Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/ocl/hearings/114 (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). 
95 Forest management in the fire context must also consider the Endangered Species 
Act, NEPA, the National Forest Management Act, and the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act. Such acts require the Forest Service and other management agencies to 
submit their plans for approval, which takes time and money, often things the agencies do 
not have. 
96 Keiter, supra note 4, at 346. 
97 Id. at 365. 
98 Id. 
99 Senators Work to Improve Forest Management and Wildfire Budgeting, U.S. SENATE 
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fewer jobs, more disease and insect infestation and the downgrading 
of habitat for wildlife and sportsmen.”101 The proposed Act calls for 
budget cap adjustments if and when suppression funding has been 
exhausted; allows for investing of excess appropriated funds in low-
fire years into fuel reduction work; authorizes spending of $500 
million over seven years for at risk communities to invest in programs 
that are tailored to reduce wildfire risk, property loss, and suppression 
costs; and expedites environmental review under the Healthy Forest 
Restoration Act, among other things.102 Though ending fire borrowing 
will undoubtedly free up funds for management and prevention 
activities, the actual cost of fighting current and future fires as well as 
the restoration of the burned lands will likely not be met by limited 
funds from a budget cap adjustment. 
Budgetary concerns also impact the review and processing of forest 
management plans. The Forest Service has noted that it has an 
extensive backlog of forest management plans that require 
revisions.103 Overall, Land Management Planning has seen a sixty-
four percent reduction in funding.104 Updated management plans are 
critical “for identifying, prioritizing, and implementing the programs 
and projects that move an NFS unit toward achieving desired 
conditions,” which in turn reduces fire risk.105 This backlog in 
planning will add to the costs that will need to be covered if the 
management and fire-fighting budgets are to return to equilibrium. As 
fire costs become more exorbitant, the government has attempted to 
recoup greater damages in recent lawsuits.106 A statutory structure for 
recovering damages would not only enforce the new public policy set 
forth by the WBRFMA, but it would provide a uniform rule both the 
government and potential responsible parties could rely on for finality 




103 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 3, at 14. 
104 Id. Under NFMA, the Forest Service is required to have Land Management Plans 
for each National Forest site that are formally revised every 10–15 years. Id. 
105 Id. 
106 The largest settlements have come from the Storrie Fire, the Copper Fire, and the 
Moonlight Fire. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1144 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008); United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Moonlight Fire Litigation, DOWNEY BRAND LLP, http://www.downeybrand.com/Our        
-Work/Moonlight-Fire-Litigation (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
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B. Legal Changes in California 
With climate change and resulting severe weather compounding a 
five-year drought, it seems as though California is constantly burning. 
The Blue Cut Fire, though only ranked the twentieth most destructive 
fire in California state history, destroyed an estimated 105 homes, 213 
other structures, and caused a mandatory evacuation of 82,000 
residents before it was fully contained.107 At least five other fires were 
still burning at the time it was extinguished. California Fire Captain 
Lucas Spelman observed, “‘[i]t’s almost like the mountains are just 
doused in gasoline . . . [t]he brush is just burning at a rate that is 
incredible.’”108 Officials worried that peak of season in September 
would only bring more intense fires.109 
In September 2012, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into 
law A.B. 1492, which purports to prevent unreasonable damage 
claims by government agencies in wildfire lawsuits.110 The bill 
specifies that when a public agency files an action to recover damages 
caused by a fire, pecuniary damages “must be quantifiable and not 
unreasonable in relation to the prefire fair market value of the 
property, taking into consideration the ecological and environmental 
value of the property to the public.”111 This could be read as no 
change at all in existing law, since damages must always be 
quantifiable and reasonable. A new release from the Governor’s 
office notes, however, that A.B. 1492 gives a boost to the State’s 
timber industry by stopping state and federal government agencies 
from seeking unlimited environmental penalties against companies 
 
107 Hailey Branson-Potts, Destructive Blue Cut Fire is Fully Contained, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-updates-wildfire-season-de 
structive-blue-cut-fire-is-fully-1471981477-htmlstory.html. 
108 Hailey Branson-Potts, Hearst Castle Remains Closed as Chimney Blaze Vexes 
Firefighters, L.A. TIMES, AUG. 23, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me    
-updates-wildfire-season-hearst-castle-remains-closed-as-chimney-1471982720-htmlstory 
.html. 
109 See Priya Krishnakumar & Joe Fox, Why the 2017 Fire Season has Been One of 
California’s Worst, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me   
-california-fire-seasons/; Claudia Geib, This Could Be The West’s Worst Fire Season Ever, 
FUTURISM (Sept. 21, 2017), https://futurism.com/this-could-be-the-wests-worst-fire-sea 
son-ever/. 
110 Collaboration and Compromise Lead to Signing of AB 1942, CAL. FORESTRY 
ASSOC. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://calforests.org/collaboration-and-compromise-lead-to-sign 
ing-of-ab-1492/. 
111 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13009.2(a) (West 2018) (emphasis added); 
Linkert, supra note 31, at 17. 
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for wildfire damage.112 One catalyst for this legislation was the 
significant victory for the federal government in United States v. CB 
& I Constructors, Inc., where the Ninth Circuit ruled that it could 
collect intangible environmental damages under California law, 
backing a jury’s nearly $29 million award.113 However, it is unclear 
whether the final language in the statute changed the law in any 
material respect. 
The rhetoric surrounding the new law clearly purports to restrict 
both California and U.S. agencies from seeking some intangible 
damages in wildfire cases, but it remains unclear whether the state 
legislature can limit natural resource damages available to the United 
States and, if so, under which circumstances.114 A comprehensive 
statute would certainly provide clarity in such situations. Often times, 
wildfires do not abide by arbitrary state lines; they burn where they 
are wont to and as such, can incur liability in multiple jurisdictions. A 
federal statute would dictate when, how, and where liability is 
applied. 
III 
TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTORY STRUCTURES AND A 
POSSIBLE WILDFIRE STATUTE 
A. Natural Resource Trustees 
Traditional common law dictates that the atmosphere, oceans, 
estuaries, forests, rivers, as well as plant and animal species are public 
trust resources protected by a sovereign or government for the benefit 
of all citizens. As such, state and federal laws have been enacted to 
further this end. The most prominent federal statutes containing 
provisions establishing management agencies as trustees of natural 
resources are CERCLA,115 OPA,116 and the National Marine 
Sanctuaries Act (NMSA).117 These Acts call on the President and 
 
112 Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Signs Bipartisan 
Legislation to Protect Jobs and Boost California’s Timber Industry, CA.GOV (Sept. 11, 
2012), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2012/09/11/news17716/. 
113 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
114 Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General 
as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 80 
(2005); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 355 (Cal. 1983). 
115 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f) (West 2018) (effective Jan. 11, 2002). 
116 Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (West 2018). 
117 National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1443(c)(1) (West 2018). 
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state governors to designate officials to serve as trustees for natural 
resources on behalf of the public.118 
In the event of an environmental disaster, the natural resource 
trustees are charged with completing a NRDA.119 The trustee’s 
primary tasks during the NRDA process are (1) determining whether 
a natural resource, including particular species, have been injured; (2) 
determining the extent of the injury in terms of the benefits that the 
resource would have provided but for the disaster and establishing 
baseline conditions, estimating recovery periods, and measuring the 
degree benefits lost; and (3) calculating the appropriate compensation 
for interim loss and determining the cost for restoration of the 
resource or replacement if restoration is not possible.120 One such 
method of calculation is HEA, which is why when tasked with 
determining damages in the wildfire context, some experts have relied 
on this widely accepted method, that has been codified in 
environmental regulations.121 
B. Habitat Equivalency Analysis 
Jurors or judges as finders of fact can rarely render a verdict to turn 
back time and put the victim of harm in the position he or she would 
have been in but for the injury-causing wrong. In most tort cases, 
juries can only award money damages, generally valuing damaged 
commodities priced on a market-based system. In the majority of 
cases, this approach is consistent with conventionally accepted 
notions of justice. However, the law has recognized some exceptions, 
including sentimental goods such as a cherished family pet or 
ornamental trees.122 Such exceptions exist because it is extremely 
difficult to assign a monetary value to Buddy, the golden retriever.123  
 
118 Kanner, supra note 17, at 376. 
119 Id. 
120 See Kanner & Nagy, supra note 81, at 420–22. 
121 Restoration selection–developing restoration alternatives, 15 C.F.R. § 990.53 
(2018). 
122 Barrios v. Safeway Ins. Co., 97 So. 3d 1019, 1023–24 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (finding 
that a dog that had been killed was extremely valuable to the owners and the loss caused 
the owners to suffer psychic trauma); Huber v. Serpico, 176 A.2d 805, 812 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1962) (finding that it is appropriate to instruct a jury to determine whether or 
not trees that were cut down possessed shade or aesthetic value or only timber value). 
123 Direct market price analysis is, on occasion, an appropriate technique to assess the 
use value of natural resources. It is best used when the good or service in question is 
commonly traded in the open market and can be considered the total value of the good,  
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Likewise, it is often difficult to express the monetary value of the 
services that ecosystems provide not only to the human population, 
but also to the flora, fauna, and global function in general. A forest, 
for example, provides services to the timber company that cuts and 
sells its trees, to the scientist that uses its plants and fungi for 
medicinal research, to the public trustee that holds its ecological value 
in trust for the citizens of the country, and to the public itself that 
hikes on its trails and enjoys connecting with nature. But the forest 
also sustains an entire ecosystem of plants and animals, bugs and 
microbes, and on a more expansive level, helps to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by acting as a carbon sink,124 which is not a direct 
human use. It is no wonder that calculating precise damages in 
environmental damages cases is often contentious. A focus on real 
restoration, as opposed to itemizing, then quantifying lost ecological 
services, is more determinate and straightforward.125 
As noted above, the primary goal of environmental statutes and the 
NRDA process is restoration. To restore a forest to its prefire 
condition, a trustee would have to account for all of the uses 
mentioned above. The trustee would also have to realize that simply 
using the monetary value of timber may not actually restore those 
things. The National Research Council explains this nuanced 
restoration well: 
In restoration, ecological damage to the resource is repaired. Both 
the structure and the functions of the ecosystem are recreated. 
Merely recreating the form without the functions, or the functions in 
an artificial configuration bearing little resemblance to a natural 
resource, does not constitute restoration. The goal is to emulate a 
natural, functioning self-regulating system that is integrated with 
the ecological landscape in which it occurs.126 
For this reason, HEA is the best option for attempting to value 
these services so that the optimal restoration of the forest system may 
 
and if there are no important external effects in its production or consumption. That is, the 
price is generated through purchase behavior and price equals value. This is true of timber 
in many cases. But a forest is a habitat with additional ecological and environmental value. 
124 Melanie Friedel, Forests as Carbon Sinks, AM. FORESTS (July 18, 2017), 
http://www.americanforests.org/blog/forests-carbon-sinks/. 
125 See generally Kanner, supra note 17; see also Robert E. Unsworth & Richard C. 
Bishop, Assessing Natural Resource Damages Using Environmental Annuities, 11 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 35 (1994). 
126 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 18 (1992), https://www.nap.edu/read/1807/chap 
ter/3#15. 
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be achieved. A relatively recent publication addressing HEA and its 
application to wildfire notes that “the ecological service metric is the 
most important input parameter in an HEA application because it 
forms the basis for all injury and restoration calculations.”127 To apply 
the next steps, services identification is crucial. 
Equivalency analysis is the idea that you should replace an injured 
resource or habitat with one of like kind and quality.128 This also 
includes interim losses of use between the initial injury and ultimate 
restoration.129 To avoid problems of having to monetize lost resources 
or services, ecological economists developed HEA to “compare the 
natural resource services produced by habitat or resource-based 
restoration actions to natural resource service losses.”130 HEA, 
therefore, is a computational method for determining the 
compensatory restoration required to offset injury to the ecological 
habitat. In its application, monetary value is removed from the scaling 
calculations in favor of focusing on natural resources and their 
associated services. 
The principles and practice of equivalency analysis, specifically 
habitat equivalency analysis, were originally developed in the early 
1990s by federal resource trustees.131 The theoretical basis for HEA 
was originally published in scientific journals devoted to resource 
economics.132 HEA started as “environmental annuities” in a 1994 
article by Robert Unsworth and Richard Bishop.133 The idea was to 
replace lost habitat—in that case, wetlands—with new habitat as 
adjusted for the interim loss and the differential in ecological services 
provided by the pre-pollution habitat and newly created habitat.134 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) guidance 
dating from the mid-1990s recommends such restoration-based 
 
127 David A. Hanson et al., Adapting Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) to Assess 
Environmental Loss and Compensatory Restoration Following Severe Forest Fires, 294 
FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 166, 168 (2013). 
128 See Joan P. Snyder & William H. Desvousges, Habitat and Resource Equivalency 
Analyses in Resource Compensation and Restoration Decision Making, 28 NAT’L. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 3 (2013). 
129 See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)(1) (2018). 
130 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (2018). 
131 Brian Roach & William W. Wade, Policy Evaluation of Natural Resource Injuries 
Using Habitat Equivalency Analysis, 58 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 421, 422–23 (2006). 
132 See generally Unsworth & Bishop, supra note 125. 
133 See id. 
134 Id. at 35–36. 
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assessments using HEA as the best methods to quantify damages in 
claims filed under OPA.135 HEA gained judicial recognition in 1999 
when it was challenged under the Daubert standard for the admission 
of expert testimony.136 The court in United States v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. recognized HEA as an acceptable methodology, 
finding as follows: 
 First, the HEA is not a scientific technique or principle that is 
subject to testing in the traditional sense. Rather, it is a 
mathematical equation that works, as any other, subject to the 
limitations of the data input into the equation. Even Great Lakes’ 
own expert testified that the HEA is a valid methodology. 
 Second, in spite of Great Lakes[’] repeated arguments to the 
contrary, the HEA, as it was used in this case, has been subject to 
peer review and has been accepted for publication. Although the 
HEA article has not yet been published, at which time it will be 
subject to further scrutiny and peer review, it did undergo 
significant scrutiny prior to its acceptance for publication. 
 Third, [b]ecause the HEA is limited by its data, questions about 
its error rate are not really applicable. In other words, the error rate 
is determined by errors in the data, not errors with the HEA itself. 
 Finally, because the HEA is a relatively new scientific model it 
has not had the necessary time to truly gain general acceptance 
beyond the government agencies Mr. Julius referred to in his 
testimony. Nonetheless, the relative “youth” of a scientific 
technique does not make it any less valid. Furthermore, the Court, 
as fact finder, will consider the testimony of Great Lakes’ experts 
when evaluating the data put into the HEA. Accordingly, the 
testimony from Mr. Julius will not be excluded.137 
By 2007, nearly every major natural resource damages pollution 
case was utilizing HEA; it had “become the primary method for 
calculating damages from pollution events nationwide.”138 
As a practical matter, HEA involves a series of steps that begin 
with identification of the ecosystem and affected ecosystem 
services.139 The next steps involve the selection of metrics 
 
135 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2018); NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., HABITAT 
EQUIVALENCY ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW 4 (Mar. 21, 1995), http://casedocuments.darrp 
.noaa.gov/northwest/cbay/pdf/cbhy-a.pdf. 
136 United States v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., No. 97-2510-CIV, 97-10075-
CIV, 1999 WL 1293469, at *1–*2 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 1999); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (explaining the Daubert evidentiary standard). 
137 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 1999 WL 1293469, at *1–*2. 
138 Matthew Zafonte & Steve Hampton, Exploring Welfare Implications of Resource 
Equivalency Analysis in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
134, 134 (2007). 
139 See 15 C.F.R. § 990.51(c) (2018). 
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representing the most important ecosystem services, quantification of 
injuries using these metrics, and the development of equivalency 
models that demonstrate how alternative restoration projects offsets 
ecosystem losses.140 HEA requires the establishment of the “debit” 
(i.e., the quantification of the negative impacts to the services 
resulting from injuries to natural resources) and the “credit” (i.e., the 
expected benefits and improvements from restoration).141 A “start 
year” and an “end year” must also be established for each side of the 
model, which indicates the date when the injury first began and when 
the injured resources were, or will be, returned to their fully restored 
condition.142 
When ecological degradation occurs, both structural integrity and 
functionality decline, although not necessarily in proportion to one 
another. As such, a newly constructed ecosystem may not be 
equivalent to the pre-disaster ecosystem in terms of either structure or 
function. Therefore, habitat-to-habitat restoration may actually require 
more habitat than was destroyed to fully compensate for the lost 
resources. A method known as “scaling” is used to account for these 
differences.143 Determining the equivalency between the debit and 
credit is conceptually simple, and there are well accepted equations or 
models for scaling compensatory restoration to match ecological 
losses: 
a. Sum the reduction in services caused by the injury. 
b. Determine the amount and timing of improvement in services 
expected per unit of restoration. 
c. Divide the total losses by the benefit per restored unit to 
calculate the scale of the required restoration.144 
As the use of HEA expanded, the method was adapted to cases in 
which injuries were more appropriately measured in numbers of 
individual resources lost, such as birds or fish, rather than in solely 
 
140 §§ 990.51–.53. 
141 STRATUS CONSULTING INC., DELIVERABLE NO. 6A: REVIEW REPORT ON 
RESOURCE EQUIVALENCE METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 7 (July 2007) [hereinafter 
REVIEW REPORT], http://www.envliability.eu/docs/REReviewUS_D6A_Stratus_FINAL 
.pdf. 
142 Id. at 8. 
143 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d). 
144 The above steps are an oversimplification of the process meant to illustrate the basic 
function. For a detailed explanation, see  REVIEW REPORT, supra note 141, at 9–14. 
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habitat units.145 In these situations, “the remediation was scaled to 
provide equivalent numbers of replacement individuals, on the theory 
that the replaced individuals would compensate for the full suite of 
ecological and human use services lost. This application of resource-
to-resource scaling came to be called resource equivalency analysis 
(REA).”146 REA “compare[s] the effects of restoration actions on 
specifically identified resources that are injured or destroyed.”147 
Ultimately, HEA and REA use the same methods to identify injury 
and restoration, but measure such observations with different units.148 
Under HEA, service losses are expressed in terms of habitat (e.g., 
acres of marsh or forest) and are offset by restoration of similar 
habitat.149 Under REA, losses are expressed in terms of resource units 
(such as the number of impacted fish or birds) and are often offset by 
projects that restore equivalent resource units.150 
This type of resource-to-resource, habitat-to-habitat restoration 
provides several benefits over traditional models that rely on 
monetization of ecosystems and their services. In traditional valuation 
models intent on putting monetary value on a natural resource, the 
trustee is forced to take extra steps by valuing the resources, assessing 
damage, and ultimately converting the monetary value in a restoration 
plan.151 HEA, on the other hand, uses the damage assessment phase to 
both value natural resources and develop a restoration plan 
simultaneously. Professor Patrick Tolan explains: 
 If forced to put a dollar figure on the assessment, trustees will 
not monetize the costs until they have already defined all of the 
corrective actions. Therefore, planning is “built-in” and all that 
remains is the execution of the restoration plan. This benefits the 
environment by (1) fostering more rapid restoration, (2) enhancing 
 
145 Id. at 3. 
146 Id. 
147 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(2)(x) (2018). HEA and REA are included among seven other 
calculation methodologies authorized by DOI, including market price, appraisal, factor 
income, travel cost, unit value/benefits transfer, contingent valuation, conjoint analysis, 
and random utility model. These listed methods are in addition to “[o]ther methodologies 
that measure compensable value in accordance with the public’s willingness to pay for the 
lost service, or with the cost of a project that restores, replaces, or acquires services 
equivalent of natural resource services lost pending restoration to baseline in a cost-
effective manner . . . .” § 11.83(c)(3). 
148 REVIEW REPORT, supra note 141, at 7. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: Failures, 
Lessons Learned, and Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REV. 409, 422 (2008). 
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opportunities for settlement by avoiding the obstacle of putting a 
dollar value on damages, and (3) affording trustees a more 
defensible litigation position, as Congress and the courts prefer 
restoration to damages.152 
HEA not only provides an ecosystem with the best chance at 
restoration, but it also fulfils the statutory requirement of efficiency 
and cost effectiveness.153 When a wildfire decimates an entire forest 
ecosystem, simply paying out the price of the cut timber or even the 
cost of replanting—which some have suggested—154 will not restore 
the ecosystem. 
Steven Kimball, the defense attorney in the Storrie Fire case, 
suggests that damages for forest fires should only be the costs of 
replanting the area.155 He argues that this is double recovery and: 
 [t]he double recovery problem disappears if damages for lost 
timber–both merchantable and nonmerchantable–are based only on 
replanting costs. Under this scenario, the United States does not 
receive monetary damages as if it would have sold the timber at 
some point in the future, which would have resulted in a clear-cut 
area in which trees needed to be replanted and a period of lost 
habitat while the trees grew to their former size. Rather, the 
government is compensated for the costs incurred in reforestation 
and for the loss of habitat during the reforestation period. Allowing 
recovery of both restoration and HEA-based environmental 
damages would make the United States whole in a manner that does 
not rely on the fiction of a future timber sale and avoids double 
recovery.156 
However, HEA requires much more than simply replanting the 
destroyed timber. It may require new soil to be deposited; it may 
require more acreage than was actually damaged in order to amount 
to the same level of services. HEA ensures that a proper analysis of 




153 Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2018); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(a) (2018). 
154 Kimball, supra note 30, at 38. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 45. 
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C. Suggestions for Adopting a Statute for Wildfire Damages 
Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, Congress had attempted 
to revise oil spill law to little or no avail as there was a stalemate 
between shipping, oil and gas, and environmentalist interests.157 The 
disaster off the coast of Alaska was the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel’s back, allowing Congress to push through political deadlock 
and adopt a sweeping statute that was to “replace the prior 
‘fragmented collection of Federal and State laws’ with a ‘single 
Federal law providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability for oil 
pollution.’”158 It is an elegant scheme that is designed to work with a 
command and control regulatory program while subjecting industry 
actors to the polluter pays principle through criminal and civil 
penalties. This shifts the burden of environmental cleanup from the 
public to the offending private sector actor.159 It allows for both 
governmental and private recovery and incentivizes industry actors to 
take the utmost care in spill prevention, but in the event that a spill 
does occur, provides a limit of liability, allowing the industry to 
continue thriving. 
There is no reason that a similar approach would not aid in 
restoring forest ecosystems after large wildfires. As noted above, the 
vast majority of the Storrie Fire settlement is still sitting in 
government coffers as bureaucrats debate the best way to handle 
restoration. If the Forest Service and Department of Agriculture were 
equipped with a statutory process similar to OPA and its 
accompanying regulations, federal and state trustees would be forced 
to work through the restoration planning phase from the outset, 
developing a restoration plan and having a governance structure in 
place for implementing said plan in a timely fashion. The Forest 
Service and its National Forest Service units already manage 
programs that are critical in forest restoration post-wildfire. The 
Forest Service’s 2015 report notes that “[t]he Vegetation and 
 
157 See Hearing to receive testimony on the liability and financial responsibility issues 
related to offshore oil production, including the Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of 
Mexico, including S. 3346, a bill to increase the civil and criminal penalties on liability 
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. 
Res., 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (testimony of Jonathan Ramseur, Specialist in Environmental 
Policy, Cong. Research Serv.). 
158 John J. Costonis, The BP B1 Bundle Ruling: Federal Statutory Displacement of 
General Maritime Law (Part I), 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10022, 10029 
(2014). 
159 Id. at 10030. 
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Watershed Management Program is the cornerstone for forest, 
rangeland, soil[,] and water restoration and enhancement activities on 
National Forest System lands and plays a key role in post-fire 
restoration.”160 The program not only improves water quality and 
quantity and the health of the forest, it also serves to reduce fire 
risks.161 The previously mentioned Land Management Planning 
program mandated by the National Forest Management Act would be 
invaluable in establishing restoration plans and goals. Both of these 
programs could be built into regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Agriculture or Forest Service at the behest of a 
wildfire statute. This would ensure that settlements like that of the 
Storrie Fire are expeditiously applied to restoration rather than kept in 
government accounts where funds are not put to use. The existing 
forest management programs would provide a starting point for all 
initial response and for later restoration efforts. Because there are 
already such extensive mechanisms, albeit underfunded, to study and 
help restore forest ecosystems, drafting a successful, comprehensive 
wildfire statute to include a natural resource damage assessment 
process that incorporated the use of HEA would not be inconceivable. 
1. Elements of Liability 
The most effective and significant feature of OPA is its strict 
liability scheme.162 OPA implements a strict liability scheme that only 
provides for three limited defenses to liability, which include an act of 
God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party.163 Such a 
liability structure ensures that the polluter, and not the public, pays for 
 
160 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 3, at 8. It should be noted that the Vegetation and 
Watershed Management Program, despite its importance, is included in the many 
programs that are underfunded and have faced increasing budget cuts. 
161 Id. at 9. 
162 OPA also provides for joint and several liability. Often in the case of oil spills there 
are multiple responsible parties. Congress sought to eliminate the inevitable finger 
pointing by including the joint and several liability structures as well as avenues for later 
contribution actions in order to expedite cleanup and restoration efforts. E.Donald Elliot & 
Mary Beth Houlihan, A Primer on the Law of Oil Spills, ALI-ABA ADVANCED ENVTL. L. 
CONF., 5 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007604. In the case of wildfires, it is not likely 
that there will be multiple responsible parties, but it would be prudent to provide for 
contribution actions all the same. 
163 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (West 2018). The omission will absolve liability only if the 
responsible party can establish that he took due care with regard to the oil and took all 
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of said third party. Id. §§ 2703(a)(3)(A)–
(B). 
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the pollution (also known as the “polluter pays principle,” a key 
policy driver behind the statute).164 Wildfire law would benefit from a 
similarly strict statute holding industry actors wholly accountable for 
their negligence in forest operations and other activities within a 
forest. Such a construction will ensure that industry is properly 
incentivized to prevent forest fires by adhering to the highest fire 
prevention best practices and strategies. 
Under OPA, any party responsible for a vessel or facility that 
releases or poses a substantial threat of releasing oil into the navigable 
waters of the United States is liable for “the removal costs and 
damages specified in subsection (b) that result from such incident.”165 
Subsection (b) lists recoverable costs and damages, which include 
removal costs, natural resource damages, real or personal property 
losses, subsistence use, revenues, profits and earning capacity, and 
public services.166 Importantly, the term “incident” encompasses the 
actions that lead up to the discharge or threatened discharge of oil.167 
If applied in the context of a wildfire, this strict liability could include 
the negligent actions of the defendant leading up to a fire, including 
failure to remove dry brush, failure to properly use heavy equipment, 
or failure to practice recommended fire prevention techniques, among 
other things. Fires that result from such accidents would trigger strict 
liability on the part of the responsible party, who would be liable for 
the restoration costs and damages. 
 
164 OPA’s strict liability regime is the embodiment of the Polluter Pays Principle. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operative Development (OECD) defines the “Polluter Pays 
Principle.” It states that: 
[t]he principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control 
measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid 
distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called “Polluter-Pays 
Principle.” This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of 
carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure 
that the environment is in an acceptable state. 
Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution 
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 468–70 
(2000) (quoting OECD, Environment and Economics: Guiding Principles Concerning 
International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, May 26, 1972, annex para. 1, 
Doc. No. C(72)128, 1972 WL 24710). 
165 33 U.S.C.A, § 2702 (West 2018). 
166 Id. § 2702(b). 
167 Id. § 2701(14) (defining “incident” as “any occurrence or series of occurrences 
having the same origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination 
thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil[.]”). 
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Despite being a strict liability statute, OPA recognizes the 
incredible financial burden that oil spills incur and, as such, provides 
for limits to liability for most responsible parties.168 The limit on 
liability would be even more prudent in a comprehensive wildfire 
statute given the financial statuses of many would-be responsible 
parties. As Linkert noted, companies are extremely concerned with 
huge damage claims akin to those in the Storrie and Moonlight Fires 
that he termed an “economic death penalty.”169 However, high 
damages deter companies from causing natural resource damages as it 
is cheaper to take precautionary steps rather than face litigation and/or 
settlement for exponentially higher figures. Nevertheless, Congress 
may seek to limit liability in any possible wildfire statute. OPA 
provides an example of such limitation. 
Under OPA, the limit to liability does not apply if it can be shown 
that a responsible party’s actions were grossly negligent, due to 
willful misconduct, or in violation of federal safety, construction or 
operating regulations.170 If a responsible party is simply found to be 
negligent, its liability is determined by the size of the vessel, 
specifically tonnage and hull construction, from which oil was 
discharged.171 Because wildfires are not started by large vessels, but 
rather often by small sparks from construction equipment or power 
lines,172 wildfire liability would need to be limited based on some 
other factor. Possible candidates include acres of forested area held, 
extent of contract with the federal government for logging purposes, 
gross annual profits, or the extent of operations on or adjacent to 
public lands. A fee schedule could be developed to account for the 
number of acres akin to the tonnage calculations contemplated by 
OPA.173 
 
168 Id. § 2704. 
169 Linkert, supra note 31, at 4. 
170 33 U.S.C.A, § 2704(c). 
171 Id. § 2704 (a). 
172 Brittny Mejia & Paige St. John, Witnesses Saw Snapped, Sparking Power Line at 
Start of Destructive L.A. Wildfire, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2017, http://www.latimes.com 
/local/lanow/la-me-fire-cause-creek-fire-20171213-story.html. 
173 Under § 2704(a), liability is determined by hull construction and tonnage. § 2704(a). 
Companies are incentivized to retrofit old vessels with double hulls in order to take 
advantage of the $1900 per ton as opposed to the $3000 per ton for only single hull or 
double side or bottom only vessels. Id. For vessels that exceed 3000 tons, the damage 
schedule increases dramatically per each type of vessel. Id. Finally, for those small, 
appropriately fitted vessels, liability is capped at a total of $800,000 or $950 per ton, 
whichever is greater. Id. Offshore facility liability is capped at the total of all removal  
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In the event that a responsible party is found liable, it would be 
prudent to develop alternative ways for such responsible parties to 
meet the damages burden in addition to possible limits to liability. 
Offsets and creative payment schemes would greatly alleviate the 
burden felt by industry working in and around forests and the 
wildland-urban interface. It would behoove the government to 
remember its financial difficulties in the forest management sector 
and strive to work with, rather than against, industry. 
The Moonlight Fire provides an excellent example of a creative 
way in which the federal government may recover costs without 
financially destroying the responsible party. The settlement agreement 
in that case included payment of $55 million as well as Sierra Pacific 
transferring title of 22,500 acres of its property.174 Though the 22,500 
acres cannot be picked up and moved, it could offset lost use damages 
calculated in the HEA. Trustees that are working on HEAs following 
wildfires should strive in settlements to work with the companies to 
determine if an arrangement such as this would be feasible and 
adequate to fully compensate for interim ecosystem service losses. 
Coordination with industry throughout the entire range of forest 
management processes to wildfire response can and should be used to 
reduce the financial burden of the federal government. 
A contract program such as that envisioned by the HFRA would 
enable government to implement hazard reduction programs with 
little expense to the public while creating more opportunities for 
logging operations to stimulate the timber industry. Currently, the 
HFRA aims “to reduce wildfire risk to communities, municipal water 
supplies, and other at-risk Federal land through a collaborative 
process of planning, prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel 
reduction projects.”175 As noted previously, it streamlines the process 
by which the Forest Service can get management plans approved 
under the federal environmental statutes, including NEPA and the 
ESA.176 It also provides avenues for the federal government to work 
with industry to manage forests in areas that they have the funding or 
man power to oversee.177 However, this partnership program has been 
 
costs plus $75,000,000. Id. Onshore facility and deepwater port liability is capped at 
$350,000,000. Id. 
174 Moonlight Fire Litigation, supra note 78. 
175 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501(1) (West 2018). 
176 See Keiter, supra note 4, at 312, and text accompanying supra note 95. 
177 See Keiter supra note 4, at 312–13. 
KANNER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2018  10:30 AM 
2018] Like a Phoenix Rising from the Ashes: 77 
Melding Wildfire Law into a Comprehensive Statute 
criticized as incentivizing the cutting of old growth trees in areas 
where industry is aiding in management.178 
In order to supplement low funding, both the Forest Service and 
the Bureau of Land Management have the authority to enter into 
“stewardship contracts,” in order to meet management goals.179 The 
contracts may not exceed ten years and are awarded on “best-value 
basis.”180 In such contracts “the value of timber and other forest 
products is applied as an offset against the cost of services 
received.”181 Critics, including government representatives, have 
raised concerns that the industry will take, or indeed are owed, the 
large trees that generally protect forests from devastating fires.182 
Further still, the processes of cutting and shipping timber create more 
fire hazards if not done properly.183 
As part of an updated contract program, to allay fears of critics, it 
would be prudent for the Forest Service to devise specific plans 
within a stewardship contract that prevents companies from taking 
advantage of the perceived logging loophole. Further still, the 
program should be expanded to include, or even require, participation 
in the wildland-urban interface, which has significantly smaller trees 
but poses a significant threat to the public. Once the proper 
management plans are devised, participation in such programs could 
act as an offset for liability in the event of a wildfire.184 
 
178 Reda M. Dennis-Parks, Healthy Forests Restoration Act—Will it Really Protect 
Homes and Communities?, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 654–55 (2004). 
179 Stewardship Contracting Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST SERV., 
http://www.fs.fed.us/restoration/documents/stewardship/guidance/FSfactStewardshipContr
acting03.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Dennis-Parks, supra note 178, at 653. One commenter calls this the logging 
loophole by which timber companies are allowed to remove large, old growth trees with 
little to no oversight for free. Id. She indicates that it creates more deadfall, or the 
accumulation of leaves, needles and branches during the cutting process that creates more 
fuel for fire, incentivizes cutting larger trees that generally protect the forest, and ignores 
the areas closer to wildland-urban interfaces with smaller trees and vegetation which is 
generally more prone to fire. Id. at 653–54. 
183 Id. at 654. 
184 Notably, because companies would be operating under government contracts in the 
hazard reduction program, it is likely that there are hold harmless clauses that would 
immunize them from lawsuits instigated by the government. However, most of these 
companies likely have operations in other parts of the country. In the event that a fire was 
started in one of these areas, participation in the stewardship contract program could 
mitigate liability. Such a set up would not only incentivize safe practices in all logging  
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A program that has proved successful in many environmental 
contexts is the development of mitigation banks. For example, in 
Louisiana, developers who wish to develop areas inside the Coastal 
Zone must select and participate in a compensatory mitigation 
program enumerated by the Louisiana Department of Natural 
Resources.185 The selected program must be included in the 
developer’s Coastal Use Permit.186 Louisiana provides a succinct 
definition of typical mitigation programs: “[m]itigation is all actions 
taken to avoid, minimize, restore, and compensate for loss of 
ecological value due to an activity.”187 It goes on to define 
compensatory mitigation as: “[r]eplacement, substitution, 
enhancement, or protection of ecological values to offset anticipated 
losses of ecological value caused by a permitted activity.”188 
The EPA has also provided for mitigation banks under section 404 
of the Clean Water Act.189 It considers a mitigation bank to be any 
“wetland, stream, or other aquatic resource area that has been 
restored, established, enhanced, or (in certain circumstances) 
preserved for the purposes of providing compensation for unavoidable 
impacts to aquatic resources.”190 Importantly, both programs exist 
under a command and control permitting regime and are tied to 
permits. 
Such mitigation banks could be used in both a permitting and 
damage calculation context in wildfire damages. As noted above, 
companies can participate in forest management under HFRA. The 
inverse could be established: that is, allow companies to pay to 
replant burned or already logged areas and “bank” the credits, likely 
in the form of acres, to offset some of the damages done by a 
negligently caused wildfire. The EPA considers the value of a 
mitigation bank to be “compensatory mitigation credits.”191 The 
instrument detailing the agreement between the bank owners, 
 
operations, but it would also incentivize participation in the program to help offset the 
costs of forest management. 
185 Compensatory Mitigation in the Louisiana Coastal Zone, STATE OF LA. DEP’T OF 
NAT. RESOURCES, OFF. OF COASTAL MGMT., http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md 




189 Mitigation Banking Factsheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www 
.epa.gov/cwa-404/mitigation-banking-factsheet (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
KANNER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2018  10:30 AM 
2018] Like a Phoenix Rising from the Ashes: 79 
Melding Wildfire Law into a Comprehensive Statute 
generally a third party that will oversee and manage the bank 
property, will disclose “the number of credits available for sale and 
requires the use of ecological assessment techniques to certify that 
those credits provide the required ecological functions.”192 This is 
similar to HEA’s habitat-to-habitat equivalency analysis, and as such, 
would work well in a calculation of wildfire damages under the 
proposed wildfire statute. Such a mitigation scheme could be included 
on permits for logging federally held land, as well as an option for 
companies to pursue following a large wildfire. In this way, states and 
the federal government will be able to recoup costs incurred in 
wildfire management in the form of restored habitat and actual 
money. Moreover, companies that may have been crushed under the 
burden of a large damages verdict or settlement have a less expensive, 
but nearly equivalent restoration impact. Proactive participation in a 
mitigation program not only benefits the company in the event of a 
negligent wildfire, but it also aides the Forest Service in restoration of 
already burned land.193 
2. Damages and Restoration 
Like all successful environmental statutes, the goal of a 
comprehensive wildfire statute should be restoration of the 
ecosystem, not simply restoration of the market valued goods such as 
timber. In recent years, HEA has been the method of choice when 
determining injury, damages, and a restoration plan for purposes of 
OPA and CERCLA.194 Scholars have highlighted the importance of 
considering and formulating restoration plans from the outset of an 
injury assessment, noting that it fosters more rapid restoration (critical 
to maintaining the public trust); it encourages settlement because it 
 
192 Id. 
193 Compulsory participation in a mitigation program in the logging context would be 
akin to the polluter pays principle, essentially building in a bank to rely on in the event of a 
wildfire. To those that would be concerned that companies participating in such programs 
may have less incentive to take all possible precaution when operating in forested areas, 
the strict liability of the statute will still operate the same. They will still be responsible 
without question for the damages caused but may have some monetary relief through 
planting bank offsets. 
194 See Ohio v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The 
court clarified that “Congress established a distinct preference for restoration cost as the 
measure of recovery in natural resource damage cases.” Id. at 441. The court distinctly 
rejected DOI’s “lesser of” rule that had been in place. Id. For an extensive explanation of 
the resultant regulation revisions, see Allan Kanner, Issues Trustees Face in Natural 
Resource Damage Assessments, Part I, 8 J. ENVTL PROTECTION 503, 505 (2017). 
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avoids placing a dollar value on resources; and it gives a natural 
resource trustee a more defensible position in litigation, especially if 
they comply with regulations, which under OPA, grants the trustee a 
rebuttable presumption in a court of law.195 
OPA provides in section 2706(e)(2) that: 
 Any determination or assessment of damages to natural 
resources for the purposes of this Act made under subsection (d) by 
a Federal, State, or Indian trustee in accordance with the regulations 
promulgated under paragraph (1) shall have the force and effect of a 
rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee in any 
administrative or judicial proceeding under this Act.196 
OPA directs NOAA to adopt regulations for the assessment of 
natural resource damages under section 2702(b)(2)(A).197 By 2008 
NOAA had codified HEA in its OPA regulations.198 
The intent of OPA “is to make the environment and public whole 
for injuries to natural resources” by restoring natural resources 
harmed from the date of the incident until recovery.199 The NOAA 
regulations define Restoration as: 
[A]ny action (or alternative), or combination of actions (or 
alternatives), to restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire the 
equivalent of injured natural resources and services. Restoration 
includes: 
 (a) Primary restoration, which is any action, including natural 
recovery, that returns injured natural resources and services to 
baseline; and 
 (b) Compensatory restoration, which is any action taken to 
compensate for interim losses of natural resources and services that 
occur from the date of the incident until recovery.200 
As provided for in the NOAA regulations, the trustee selects an 
approach for primary restoration.201 The selection process, which 
assigns broad discretion to trustees, should consider a natural 
recovery option, as well as active primary restoration actions, which 
includes viable alternatives to their preferred method.202 The ultimate 
 
195 See Kanner, supra note 17. 
196 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(e)(2) (West 2018). 
197 Id. § 2706(e)(1). 
198 See 15 C.F.R. § 990 (2018). 
199 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2018). 
200 Id. § 990.30 (emphasis added). 
201 Id. §§ 990.42(a)(3), .53(b) (2018). 
202 Id. § 990.53(b)(2). 
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goal is restoration to baseline conditions.203 Following primary 
restoration, the trustee must then consider compensatory restoration 
measures.204 The quantification of interim losses, conditional on 
implementation of primary restoration, becomes an input into the 
analysis of compensatory restoration actions.205 Compensatory 
restoration is necessary to compensate for the interim loss of natural 
resources/services from the time of injury until full recovery.206 
Like OPA, CERCLA has accompanying regulations that lay out 
the parameters of detailed injury and damage assessments, otherwise 
known as Type B procedures, in 43 C.F.R. § 11.60. An assessment 
performed pursuant to the regulations would begin with the trustee 
determining the “physical, chemical, and biological baseline 
conditions and the associated baseline services for injured resources 
at the assessment area,”207 and comparing those to “the extent to 
which natural resource services have been reduced as a result of the 
injuries.”208 After detailing the manner in which resource 
recoverability; a restoration and compensation determination plan; 
and alternatives to restoration, rehabilitation, replacement and/or 
acquisition of equivalent resources would be identified and 
determined, the regulations set forth the types of cost estimate and 
valuation methodologies that may be used. Such methodologies 
include HEA. It enumerates methods for determining: 
The costs of the selected alternative for (i) the restoration or 
rehabilitation of the injured natural resources to a condition where 
they can provide the level of services available at baseline, or (ii) 
the replacement and/or acquisition of equivalent natural resources 
capable of providing such services; and the compensable value of 
the services lost to the public through the completion of the baseline 
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of 
equivalent natural resources.209 
Notably, a trustee is not required to select one of the listed 
methodologies as the regulations under both CERCLA and OPA are 
not mandatory, but mere guidance.210 However, if they choose to 
 
203 Id. 
204 Id. § 990.53(c). 
205 Id. § 990.53(c)(2). 
206 Id. § 990.30. 
207 43 C.F.R. § 11.72(a) (2018). 
208 Id. § 11.71(a)(1). 
209 Id. § 11.83(a)(1). 
210 See id. § 11.83 (2018); see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.52–.53 (2018). 
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pursue a different method, they will not receive the benefit of a 
“rebuttable presumption” in a court of law.211 
Should a comprehensive wildfire statute be adopted, the Forest 
Service and perhaps the Bureau of Land Management would be 
charged with promulgating similar regulations. NOAA’s and the 
Department of Interior’s regulations are optimal examples of 
incorporating HEA into natural resource damage assessments. Like 
both OPA and CERCLA, the wildfire statute should give natural 
resource trustees the benefit of the doubt and honor their expertise 
with a statutorily imposed rebuttable presumption. Such a rebuttable 
presumption may prove invaluable should the case advance to trial 
and may even serve to encourage settlement between the parties. 
3. Rebuttable Presumption 
As noted above, Linkert was concerned with what many call “the 
battle of the experts” in wildfire NRDAs.212 However, were a 
comprehensive statute devised and natural resource trustees given the 
rebuttable presumption, such battles should be limited. The natural 
resource damage assessment process can be extremely detailed and 
time consuming, and allowing defendants to challenge the work of 
experts in which they are generally invited to participate in a court of 
law will only serve to delay the restoration process. 
Presumably, Congress allowed for the rebuttable presumption not 
only to expedite litigation, but to encourage would-be defendants to 
work with the trustee to ensure that their science aligns with the 
damage assessment. However, this is not always the case and 
responsible parties under other environmental statutes have been 
known to challenge trustee findings in court.213 Such challenges are 
traditionally analyzed under the test articulated in Daubert v. Merrel 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which requires the judge to be a 
gatekeeper of admissible testimony by ensuring that the trial is not 
inundated by experts that add very little to the discussion.214 
Importantly, the Daubert test is not a platform for the judge to decide 
the credibility or accuracy of particular science.215 The Daubert court 
 
211 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(e)(2) (West 2018). 
212 Linkert, supra note 31, at 8–10. 
213 See, e.g., In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, 
on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179. 
214 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
215 Id. at 590. 
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noted that if the judge were to screen out science based on a strict 
reading of Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702, it would “sanction a 
stifling and repressive scientific orthodox and will be inimical to the 
search for truth.”216 Because the Daubert standard is meant to act 
merely as a gatekeeper rather than a test for the accuracy of scientific 
methodology and results,217 it could easily be argued that those 
statutes that utilize NRDAs and their accompanying regulations 
already perform Daubert functions and as such, challenges under the 
standard are frivolous. By setting forth methodologies in the 
regulations promulgated by NOAA that are approved for trustee use, 
OPA is providing the gatekeeping function envisioned by Daubert. 
The mere fact that Congress delegated authority to federal and state 
trustees to carry out NRDAs utilizing their own professional 
experience and opinions should indicate to a court that the trustee is 
qualified as an expert. They are expected to balance not only science, 
but also law and policy while conducting their assessment. A Daubert 
challenge can only conceivably challenge the science without 
considering, much less acknowledging, the legal and policy drivers 
that direct a trustee’s final conclusions. The further addition of the 
rebuttable presumption should indicate the government’s faith in the 
trustee’s ability to consider and manage all three prongs of his 
responsibility. If the trustee has complied with federally promulgated 
methods, such methods should be considered accepted by the 
scientific community and reliable for a trier of fact. As such, in the 
event that a defendant challenges a trustee’s opinions or expertise, the 
regulations should be a sufficient gatekeeper. The judge need only 
determine that the trustee, who is inherently an expert by virtue of 
Congress’ delegation of authority, has complied with the 
methodologies set forth in the applicable regulations. Any other 
action by the court would usurp the trustee’s congressionally 
delegated authority and would go far beyond the gatekeeping function 
of the Daubert standard. 
A comprehensive wildfire statute should articulate the rebuttable 
presumption, the burden shifting effect of the same, and note that if 
the trustee’s expertise is challenged in court, the trustee’s findings 
should only be held to the standards set out in the regulations 
promulgated by the Forest Service. Such a structure will ensure that 
 
216 Id. at 596. 
217 Id. at 597. 
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restoration is achieved as expeditiously as possible, which in turn will 
restore the public trust and make the public whole once more. 
4. Interaction with State Law 
Often the federal government, states, and private parties will all 
have claims for damages following environmental disasters. As such, 
it is important to ensure that all appropriate avenues of redress remain 
available to those who need them. Generally speaking, federal law 
preempts state law when state law conflicts with the federal scheme. 
However, under OPA, Congress saw the importance of leaving state 
law intact for purposes of state natural resource damage recovery. 
OPA states that it shall not “affect, or be construed or interpreted as 
preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof 
from imposing any additional liability or requirement with respect to” 
discharges of oil and pollution within the state and removal activities 
connected therewith.218 OPA also preserves obligations and liabilities 
of persons under state law, including general common law.219 This 
preservation is important to ensure that states are able to recover 
damages that the Federal government may not have contemplated. 
Importantly, states are responsible for their public trust,220 and need to 
retain their authority to pursue claims for damages to trust resources. 
Further still, a state needs to be able to enforce permitting 
requirements that may have been violated, as well as their own 
criminal authorities. Thus, federal law cannot possibly “occupy the 
entire field.”221 
CONCLUSION 
As we continue to see wildfires burn more frequently, longer, and 
well outside of typical patterns, it is imperative that the Forest Service 
 
218 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), (a)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2018). 
219 Id. § 2718(a)(2). 
220 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 406 (1842) (recognizing that the States, 
not the Federal government, are the owners of the public trust). 
221 For a discussion of preemption and environmental law, see Costonis, supra note 
158. In typical preemption analysis, courts consider specific terms including “questions” to 
which a statute “speaks directly,” whether or not it is “comprehensive,” or “occupies an 
entire field.” Analyzing statutes in this way allows courts to identify interstitial gaps that 
they are permitted to fill through judge made law. It will also determine whether or not a 
statute may be supplemented with law that operates in the same field, for example the Oil 
Pollution Act and its relation to admiralty law. There is much debate about whether 
admiralty law has a place in an OPA case, however, it is abundantly clear from OPA’s 
savings provision that state law is indeed preserved. 
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and other natural resource trustees be equipped to fight those blazes 
and properly manage lands in an effort to prevent them. The 
WBRFMA is a starting point to fix the funding deficits faced by the 
Forest Service, but it will not be able to completely cover the costs of 
management and fire-fighting that are going to continue to grow. A 
comprehensive wildfire statute could help to fill that void. Such a 
statute would not only provide certainty, finality, and incentives for 
prudent operations to industry, but it may even encourage those 
industries and the government to work together to manage and protect 
the forests on which the public relies. With a comprehensive wildfire 
statute, forests may finally fall back into a natural cycle that has been 
absent for nearly 200 years, living and working with fire rather than 
against it. 
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